The Logoclasody Manifesto

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The Logoclasody Manifesto

"My words fly up, my thoughts remain below,
Words without thoughts, never to Heaven go."

— Shakespeare. *Hamlet,* III, iii.

"Truth is the revealing of what is concealed."

— Martin Heidegger

Compare this to the "truth" that you are familiar with, which says that truth is a matter of consensus, which says that truth is a matter of agreement. . . .

"For He hath turned the shadow of death into the morning, . . ."

— Christopher Smart. *Jubilate Agno.*

Logoclasody

ody / ode / *aeidein,* to sing

of logoclastics and of eidetics and of pannarrativity

Objective Art

Logoclasody is *objective art,* because signification is neutral.

Signification is not "meaning." Signification and meaning are distinct. Signification is the same for each instance of meaning. For while signification makes meaning happen, it does not determine that meaning.

What is signification and where does it take place?

Signification is the bond that holds between a sign and a signified.

signification / *the semiotic function*

Without signification, "writing" is a chaos of matter.

A signified "exists" within a collective mind. A sign exists as a concrete individual thing (numerically distinct, but alike). Signification takes place in the mind of a reader (a redder / *redding* is a putting into order, and the ordering [management] of change).

a concrete individual — an abstract universal concept in the mind

What does it mean to say, "objective art"?

Signification is not "meaning." Signification and meaning are distinct. Signification is the same for each instance of meaning. For while signification makes meaning happen, it does not determine that meaning.

This *objectivity* is with regard to the poet, not with regard to the redding.

What is "logos"?

What is "logos"?

"Logos" is a principle.

"Logos" is <u>an ordering principle</u>.

It is by virtue of [the] *logos* that seemingly different things can [do] come together under a common name.

For instance: I have several different [specific] types of *chairs* in my home, they are *specific* (numerically distinct, but alike) but they all come together under the *general* name / noun "chair."

The logos is <u>the principle of the noun</u>.

The logos is the principle of the noun, by virtue of which *the proper* is collected under / into *the common.*

proper / common

specific / general

What do words do? Words stand for things.

This is not to say that *a word* and *what it stands for* are one and the same. They exist . . . differently.

> *the word, that you see, that you hear, that you write, that you speak, and that you feel*

Words are, in a sense, *portable things.* I do not need to carry things around with me if I can just take out a word and give it to you and thereby give to you the thing I have in mind to give to you.

And with that, say,

> *"listen not to me, but to the logos,"*

> *[to what is common to all]*

listen to my *word.*

This is how names, *nouns,* function — they collect all those things that they stand for and make them available in a portable, transportable, translatable, *word.*

The logos is the principle of the noun.

logoclastics / the poem is / as a matter [*matter*] of interlocking, or, rather, *interlocuting* (*loqui,* to speak, *inter,* between), syntactical elements.

A syntactical element / a single word, a sentence, a clause, *or,* a semanteme, a sememe, a morpheme [a *sememe* is the meaning of a *morpheme*] *or* a suspension. . . .

How much thought [*matter / what is the matter?*] is represented by a suspension!

How much grammatical function is represented by a suspension!

What is a "suspension"? *

Think of a bridge, *a suspension bridge.* A suspension bridge "bridges" two sides . . . it brings them together, so to speak. And when you happen upon a suspension . . .

if you could see a suspension, it would look something like this

• • •

those are suspension points,
a series of dots,
a series of dots indicating "an omission" or "a holding back."

And when you happen upon a suspension, and you "bridge" that suspension. . . .

And what do you "bridge" it with, but with your own sense, your own logic, your own meaning [conception / enunciation / epitome / !]. . . .

And when you happen upon a suspension, and you *bridge* that suspension . . . you are making *signification* happen.

And you have set free the logos —

logoclastics has happened — the "breaking out" of logos.

* "Suspensions" are not, and ought not to be confused with, *the caesura,* which has to do with a pause in rhythm. Suspensions are a matter of logic, and I am using the term in a somewhat specialized sense. The suspension, however, is more than a mere device or contrivance to facilitate participation / reciprocation / intention on the part of the reader . . . just be conscious of yourself when you are communicating and you'll realize that suspensions are not only frequent-as-to-be-habitual but are indispensable, but are elemental to language usage. And neither is the suspension an instance of *aposiopesis* ["a becoming silent"] which is a rhetorical device employed for dramatic effect. Consider that the aposiopesis is "outward" while the suspension is "inward."

A suspension . . . is at once a break, and a connection, a nexus for the radiance that is logos — and thereby, *discourse!*

the suspension / the anacoluthon
the suspension / the "lacking sequence" [*in a manner lacking sequence*]

poetry as discourse / the poem as revealer.

communication, a passage from the creative intuition [of the poet] to the receptive intuition [of the reader [a redding] / this requires a sort of previous, tentative consent — to the poem and to the intentions of the poet — without which we cannot be taken into the confidence of the poem].

or: the relaxing of the critical intelligence. for how can you reflect upon an experience if you have not first had that experience?

Logoclastics is a making visible.

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Of things immanent and transcendent.

Thomas Aquinas' "id quod visum placet," or, [the beautiful is] that which, being seen, pleases. [the body — *the bloc?* — of words / text]

integrity

proportion (consonance) / ratio [e · ratio — *"postmodern" proportion?*]

radiance / clarity [causes intelligence to see] [logos / *in itself*]

If the poets cannot act authentically in the way of logos . . . who, then?

Who, then?

    The Latin, *vates,* was both a poet and a diviner, a bard and a seer.

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    The Latin, *vates,* was both a poet and a diviner, a bard and a seer.

Of things immanent and transcendent.

Abstract Poetry?

from figuration to abstraction

if nouns are as "concrete word pictures"

In contrast to the use of nouns, which are as "concrete word pictures," we turn to the meanings of those nouns, the meanings which are shared by all those things collected under the noun. E.g., the noun "chair." All chairs share similar characteristics. These similar characteristcs [*that which pertains to all*] are the "structures" [definitions / "meanings"] underlying the noun "chair."

This is, in effect, a reverse Nominalism.

Whereas the Nominalist says "only names exist,"
here we read "only meanings exist."

From Russell (and then the early Wittgenstein). It is Russell's logical atomism *[or, "atoms of meaning"]. These "atoms of meaning" are in essence the similar characteristics, or grammatical structures, underlying the nouns [or, names of things]. (Each part of a proposition, say of the proposition "chair," is an atom of meaning. If the atom of meaning "seat" is absent, then the proposition is false, because a chair must have a seat to be a chair. Each atom can be split into more atoms.)*

If nouns are as "concrete word pictures,"
then, by analogy, meanings are as "*abstract* word pictures."

abstract terms denote *notions, concepts, ideas*
concrete terms denote *the physically real and perceptible by the senses*

Here, in essence, is a philosophy [*a poetics*] of abstract poetry.

what is the eidos, or, form, of a noun? is not a noun a picture? do we not "see" nouns?

[in what way does language "show"?]

eidos = concretely: actual shape, the visible

eidos = abstractly: conceptual intelligibility

concrete is to the senses as abstract is to the mind.

concrete is to what shows as abstract is to what tells.

an analogue clock will *show* you the time.
a digital clock will *tell* you the time.

this statement is both *presentative* and *re-presentative*

this statement is both *an end in itself* [the intransitive]

and *a means* to another end [transitive]

language is both communication and self-expression

The mind knows the word in the figure of its substance.

The mind knows the word in the figure of its substance.

The mind knows the word in the figure of its substance.

The mind knows the word in the figure of its substance.

The mind knows the word in the figure of its substance.

The mind knows the word in the figure of its substance.

The mind knows the word in the figure of its substance.

Or, what is a crash course in eidetic poetry.

For only *in eidos* do words have the substantiality of things.

Or, think of eidos in the sense of *outline*. Think of the instrument we call

<div align="center">

the eidograph.

</div>

eidos, "form, figure" / *graphein,* "to write"

The eidograph traces <u>an outline</u>. The eidograph traces <u>a figure</u>.

If I ask of you: Say, would you give me an "outline" of that novel?
What would "outline" mean to you? How would you think of "outline"?
What would you be giving me?

outline [eidos] / synopsis / blueprint / profile

Could you make of this sense of *outline* a guiding principle for a sort of poetry?

The eidograph is *a visualizing, a making concrete* of an eidos.

The eidos is both *the idea* and *the form of the visualization of the idea.*

eidos = <u>concretely</u>: actual shape, the visible

eidos = <u>abstractly</u>: conceptual intelligibility

Eidetics studies <u>the visualization of the idea</u>.

Eidetics is <u>the visualization of the idea</u>.

Think: <u>complementarities</u>.

eidetic / synoptic (*syn,* "together")

syn · optic | *syn,* together, *opsis,* of sight

Seeing the whole together.

       The eidograph is a picture of language-in-eidos, of language in conceptus, language in situ, in general, in ideal form. An eidograph is a telling by way of showing, it is a concrete telling, it is the special poésie of the eidetic poet. The eidograph is a picture of language-in-eidos.

Nietzsche said, *philosophy is biography.* It may be the same can be said for poetics. Or: What happened when concrete poetry deserted signification for the materiality of the letter? This is not the biography of concrete poetry, but of the "visual poet." Calling what he does "poetry," the visual poet enables his work to be thought of as a form of literature. *But is it not really typography?* One thinks of the decorative swash letter. A flourish [or, elongation of the kern] here, a flourish [or, elongation of the kern] there. . . .

Or, and in a most general sense, is it not simple *graphic symbollurgy?* Or ideography? (But . . . less the sounds that form its name [as in a phonetic system], less a name, less an idea or object. . . .)

Eidography? Symbollurgy?

Draw for me <u>the hieroglyphic of the world</u>. [By necessities *a griphos?*]

<u>Eidography</u> is <u>the symbollurgy</u> of <u>the hieroglyphic of the world</u>.

What does <u>the hieroglyphic of the world</u> look like? [By necessities *a griphos?*]

When we say of *the calligraphy,* "this is visual poetry," what do we mean / what are we really saying?

Some abstract *ratio* in common is implied.
We ask, *in relation to what?*
We answer, *in relation to visual poetry.*

calligraphy = "beautiful writing"

kalli, kalos, "beautiful" / *graphein,* "to write"

When we say "calligraphy is visual poetry," we are speaking analogically / we are saying "calligraphy is visual poetry analogically."

analogy = *ana,* "according to" / *logos,* "ratio, proportion"

We must distinguish between visual poetry and what is visual poetry analogically. They are not the same thing — one is visual poetry, the other is not.

Calligraphy and visual poetry are "visual poetry" not in the same sense but analogically.

Speaking analogically about visual poetry, we open ourselves to 1) vagueness, 2) inappropriatness, and 3) self-contradiction.

Where lies the eidetic in calligraphy? The calligraphic eidetic is found in the line, in the cursive-script line, as here we see the visualization of the idea insofar as the line depicts or portrays the quality of emotion [the temperamental disposition / the rhythmic character] of the writing. In this we "see" joy, grace, wonderment, etc.

the calligraphic predicate eidetic complement [predictive]

And we hold in distinction to this:

the calligraphic objective eidetic complement [existential]

Think: complementarities.

syn · optic | *syn,* together, *opsis,* of sight

Interlocation:

as mental interlocation / logical space [language in eidos]

collocation / a speaking together [a choros]

interlocution / interlocation / topology [topology: this is time,

the simultaneity / knowing present, to past, present and past knowing /

how memory (by definition of the past) exists concurrently!]

In this interlocking / *interlocution* [inter / ruption, dis / location] we

discern the discourse, the logos.

A reference to topology — which is the study of *surface,* or *location,* or *situation,* but never, however, of *place* — and to Lacan's *non-seminar,* "Time and Topology." Consider this "space" the space of topology — which is used by Lacan as a metaphor for mind [consider: *is this a more sophisticated "logical space"?*]. Space is but a want of intervening points. The space / time of topology begins when a point, in space, exists in relation, or location, or *pro-position* to another point in space [and prior to a surface].

Only once a point is positioned does "time" come into being [or, enter into consciousness], and this "time" spreads with space, it is contiguous with it and cannot exist without it — *it is the time it takes to travel from one point to another. . . .*

Here is *space*:

And here, a point *in space*:

•

And here, another point *in space*:

• •

And when we connect the points . . . we have *a line*:

•——————•

"Time" is "how long it takes" to travel from one point to another.

If we say "thought-time is instantaneous," what, then, about the time it takes for us to remember something we have forgotten — or is that "lost time"?

Now consider the "point" [*what is your "point"?*] to be *a proposition* [it is *a syntactical element,* it is what I call *a compass-unit of logic,* or *discourse,* or *knowledge* — Lacan calls these units "mathemes"]. It is a "point," in relation to other "points," and in that relationship / the generation of discourse. . . .

The proposition — the grammatical structure [or, atom of meaning] — is an atopic abstract "anywhere" which becomes a matheme [a compass-unit of discourse] in the redding.

In my Go work, the reverse indentations are as Cartesian coordinates, each node a matheme, a compass-unit of discourse.

The word basis *has the Greek root* bainein, *"to go." To be* at basis *is to be at "the get go," to be "from the word go" (or, "from the very beginning").*

logoclastics / the poem is / as a matter [*matter*] of interlocking, or, rather, *interlocuting* (*loqui,* to speak, *inter,* between), syntactical elements.

A syntactical element / a single word, a sentence, a clause, *or,* a semanteme, a sememe, a morpheme [a *sememe* is "the meaning" of a *morpheme*]. . . .

a sememe is the meaning [the *sense* or *thought content*] of a morpheme

The logos, what was up to this time hidden (in poetry, in discourse).

The Latin, *vates,* was both a poet and a diviner, a bard and a seer.

logoclastics

"The break in discourse."

Logoclastics is my term for "the break in discourse." I translate *logos* as "discourse" and *clastics* as "to break," and I do emphasize this "break" must be understood not as in to fault or to violate, but as in "to break the news," or as in "the break of day," or as in a "breaking out."

The effect of *logoclastics* is to realize of the reader a conscious participant in *the breaking out* of signification.

The effect of *logoclastics* is not to render *meaning* indeterminate, but to make play of its elasticity, to make play at the very position at which signification occurs.

The effect of *logoclastics* is to break discourse, but such that it may be reformed — in the conscious, deliberative intellection / ideation of the reading — and so as to actuate and to celebrate signification.

And so as to actuate and to celebrate signification.

Break:
to lay open / to make a disclosure of / *to break the news*
to come into being / a beginning to appear / to dawn [it dawns upon me,
it occurs to me] / *the break of day*

*to come into e*vide*nce*

This break, *this disjunctive* — a disjoining or separation, *a suspension*
— the relation between two or more alternatives (of a proposition) /
indicating a contrast or an alternative between ideas [an either / or].

to come into e*vide*nce [the emerging-in-language]

> *the expressibility, the*
> *emerging-in-language, the*
> *entire articulatory movement*

eVIDEnce

No wonder we say "seeing is believing." This is the "eye-e*vide*ntiary."

to *break out*
the suspension / suspension points
of what is to follow, or of what is to be the inference
[dispersed, but not dissolved]

Indeterminacy: *not to be construed as the absence of intentionality.*

e·ratio

ratio —
(to think it, the inward thought, the name of it)

o·ratio —
(to speak it, the flatus vocis)

e·ratio —
(to show it, to write it, to make it visible:
the complemental pointing finger!)

iteration
it / *eratio* / n

iteration as a strategy:
the frequentative:
anaphora in oratory (*oratio,* to speak)

This iteration is at once a conceit and the means toward introducing
conceits. This formulaic and incremental iteration is at once a conceit
[in itself] and the means toward introducing conceits.

Fractal [from the Latin, *frango, frangere,* "to break, fracture, fraction"]

The equations of fractal geometry are nonlinear,
meaning that they do not have definite solutions but are recursive,
<u>iterating</u> themselves fractionally, producing endless approximations with
<u>a difference of scale</u>.

fractal [self-similarity]

Suspension:
a nonappearance.

Suspensions are not, and ought not to be confused with, *the caesura,*
which has to do with a pause in rhythm. Suspensions are a matter of
logic, and I am using the term in a somewhat specialized sense. The
suspension, however, is more than a mere device or contrivance to
facilitate participation / reciprocation / intention on the part of the reader
. . . just be conscious of yourself when you are communicating and you'll
realize that suspensions are not only frequent-as-to-be-habitual but are
indispensable, but are elemental to language usage. And neither is the
suspension an instance of *aposiopesis* ["a becoming silent"] which is a
rhetorical device employed for dramatic effect. Consider that the
aposiopesis is "outward" while the suspension is "inward."

A suspension . . . is at once a break, and a connection, a nexus for the
radiance that is logos — and thereby, *discourse!*

the suspension / the anacoluthon
the suspension / the "lacking sequence" [*in a manner lacking sequence*]

Pannarrativity

Pannarrativity:

narratives — *fragments of narrative* [this is "quotation"] removed from their original context and placed [in-corporated / *in string*] into a new context take on new meanings (while retaining something of their original intention).

Narrative — the word / logos — is everywhere.

The world is a narrative.

The world "writ large." Pan-narrativity.

quotation / connotation / denotation / quotation

The pannarrative text. If "text-collage" is the general term for such, then *a* "text collage" composed of *fragments* (word fragments, words, sentences, verses, elements [quotation]) **of narrative** (*narrative* as found / appropriation) "stitched" together. It is a sort of "list" or "roll call."

The pannarrative poem begins by seeing all the world as one great narration — a narrative that is known in proportion to the degree of the relation of its parts.

As an instance of the *pannarrative text* (or, of, *the collage text*) I here do offer a text. And notice, please, the composition, the assemblage, is of *things* from the world writ large, from the world all around me, and these are mixed with my own sensibilities, with my own emotions (and that my poem is the analogue to the *expressionist* depiction, *and thus an ekphrasis of sorts*). [In poetry, and perhaps in all poetry, but especially in *expressionist* poetry, the more "things" are themselves, the more they signify something else.] In the act of placing these *things* into my poem, I am citing them, saying their names, *making quote of them* and as though listing them, calling them out, appropriating them (this is what I mean by "appropriation" — things are not quoted, or, *appropriated,* from other pre-existing texts [this is not *a language cut-and-paste* from pre-existing texts] but here these *things* are found in the world all around you, the world as one great narration, *the world writ large*):

Self-Portrait with Bandaged Ear

the reed of a loom
the guideways, of a loom, or

when suddenly, when suddenly
this is spring, and this is summer

and this, this is open sky.
the birds resemble a man.

dandelion. giddying.
budded. spree.

roundly, with joy
for nothing and for everything

the day, with my own heart
too soon, arrayed. this haste

this pasturing. this coffee companion.
this cup. this yellow sky

The pannarrative poem, then, is constituted of fragments of narrative (which in their dislocative / disjunctive state are potentially plurisignificative) and *uses juxtaposition as a principle of composition.* (And like the metaphor, produces semantic changes, and thereby increases language.)

While not quite on the level of the metaphor, I see *pannarrativity* as coming to be a sort of stand-in for the metaphor, requiring, to its own end, an intuitive competence — an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars [*an eye for resemblances*] as found in the disjunction (the logoclastics) that posits the juxtaposition. (And like the metaphor, produces semantic changes, and thereby increases language.)

It becomes clear:
the difference, between the pannarrative poem and the collage text.

The neologism increases language in the calculative way of the denotation, while the metaphor increases language in the poetic way of the connotation.

"Keep this object faithfully."

Why, the self-mutilation of Vincent van Gogh? What is the significance of the self-mutilation of Vincent van Gogh?

I see van Gogh's self-mutilation as the climax of the drama [the doing] of his personal suffering [from the depth of the abyss, *de profundis*]. His personal failure [to be the evangelist, a preacher of the Gospel, to minister to *the Christian laborer*] was a betrayal to his faith. I see van Gogh's *personal suffering* [so much as one can see into another's heart of hearts] as just that, a personal betrayal of Christ. The cutting off of his right ear, is the symbol of the betrayal of Christ. Did van Gogh pray, at that moment, for a miraculous healing of his suffering? And who better to bring the ear to than a prostitute [in this, *de profundis*]. I see van Gogh's self-mutilation as the climax of the drama [the doing] of his personal Passion . . . a longing for redemption and peace.

See

John 18:10 — the injury, the symbol of the betrayal.

Luke 22:50/51 — the miraculous healing of the injury.

Pannarrativity and Anonymity

The problem of *the collage poem* and anonymity.

anonymous writing / *one does not belong to what one has written?*

signature / voice / sensibilities / *whose?*

[or,
as follows Barthes,
the view that all texts are *plural, equivocal* and *indeterminate*?]

Indeterminacy: *not to be construed as the absence of intentionality.*

Narrative — the word / logos — is everywhere.

The world is a narrative.

The world "writ large." Pan-narrativity.

quotation / connotation / denotation / quotation

Pannarrativity and the Feminine

Pannarrativity and the feminine text.
Femininity and the pannarrative text.
Syllabic verse and the pannarrative text.
Is the sentence the new lyric?

logoclasody

ody / ode / *aeidein,* to sing

Addendum 1:

Crash Course in Logoclastics

Crash Course in Logoclastics

Four Cardinal Notes of Logoclastics

(1) An exploration of *indeterminacy.* (2) There is *in effect* a dislocation of discourse, i.e., the discourse *is not anterior to* the reading, but (3) occurs in the text's being *redd.*

Consider, that in our post-logocentric climate, works of logoclastics may be all that is left to us. Discourse is no longer centered in words — whose stability of meaning is ob-literate, strictly expunged from the letter — but occurs in the text's being redd.

The term, *logoclastics. Logos,* is discourse. *Clastics,* to break. Logoclastics, *the break in discourse.* A dislocation of discourse. *Dislocation,* is the putting-out-of-place. Discourse is dis-located to the part (-icipation, the activity) of the reader.

Redding, is a putting-in-order.
To the conscious, deliberative, intentional act of signification.
To induce a narrativity in the reader!

In regard to a *foregrounding,* either in the text
or of a "reading strategy," *logoclastics* may be said to (4) foreground
the communicative value of discourse.

Indeterminacy. Not to be confused with "indeterminism," "inconclusive" or "uncertainty." The root of this word is *terminus,* "limit." *Indeterminacy* = "the state or quality of being indeterminate." *Indeterminate* = "having inexact limits." My alternate word for "indeterminacy" is *eratio.* † We will recall that for Plato there are in the universe only four kinds of things, which are called *limit, indeterminacy,* the *result* of mixing these two, and the *cause* of their mixing. And that reason (or, *ratio*) imposes *limit* on what is indeterminate. It is important to note that two of Plato's four "kinds of things" are forerunners of two of Aristotle's four causes: "indeterminate" is akin to the material cause, and "limit" is akin to the formal cause.

Where concerns logoclastics, indeterminacy is not the divorce of *the material* and *the formal.* They are taken together — and so, *eratio.* The point of distinction being that *the discourse is not anterior to the reading (but occurs in the text's being redd).*

† *Eratio* [defined].

E = "indeterminate," "material,"

ratio = "limit," "form," "intellectual content."

Our post-logocentric climate. This is, first of all, a call to action (a call to consciousness). What has been obscured ("lost," "post," "past") is the consciousness of signification — the consciousness of signification as an action, as a doing, as a conscious doing-with-deliberation (*a redding*). This consciousness does not awaken us to a degeneration, but (and to the opposite effect) to a higher level of purpose and procedure — to the consciousness of *signification* as *a doing-with-deliberation.* (To be conscious of signification, of *the-bond-that-holds-between.*) To the conscious, deliberative, intentional act of signification.

Logoclastics = *the break in discourse.* The range of the works of logoclastics is great, and includes not only those works that are deliberately explorations of indeterminacy, in themselves *and* in the redding, but all works that present us with a break or dislocation of discourse, all works that in effect occasion (BUT MORE TO THE POINT, THAT AWAKEN AN AWARENESS OF) the conscious, deliberative, intentional act of signification. *All works that occasion a narrativity in the reader.* For starters, all works that begin in the consciousness that ours is a post-logocentric climate, all works that begin in the consciousness that discourse is no longer centered in words but occurs in the text's being redd, in the conscious, deliberative, intentional act of signification — *these are works of logoclastics!*

One of the cardinal notes of postmodern poetry is *the will to make play,* to make play of language, to make of language a building blocks, to make of language a sand box, but this can only *create value* if the objective is to rediscover, to recover language as the stuff, the physis, of poetry.

Ours is an age of anxiety, of dissociation of sensibility, of pessimism, cynicism, incredulousness. Our state, our condition, is a constant "fight or flight." We are a matter of excretions. Our wets. Our arts. Our poetry. Excretions, anxieties, this enormity, this Behemoth.

Ours is the age of canned laughter. (There is an analogue for this in poetry.) This has been imposed on us. We — *we poets!* — must struggle to be free of this.

Addendum 2:

Concrete to Eidetic

The visual poem has become a genus of poetry unto itself. When we speak of "visual poetry," we no longer have in mind or make reference to *just* the "pattern" (or "shape," or "emblematic") poem

(I prefer to call these "eidetic poems" — from the Greek *eidos,* meaning "that which is seen" — because the idea is given directly to the eye and *thus* a mental image is formed — one is interpreting *a figure* which seems to be external, in contrast to the interpretation of words *as such*)

The visual poem has become a genus of poetry unto itself. When we speak of "visual poetry," we no longer have in mind or make reference to *just* the "pattern" (or "shape," or "emblematic") poem, in the manner, say, of George Herbert's *Easter Wings,* his *Altar,* or his *Cross,* or Lewis Carroll's *Mouse's Tale,* or John Hollander's *Swan and Shadow,* but we may be speaking of an ever extensible field or *genre* of poetry (yea, genre of *writing*) with respect to which we can discern certain common characteristics according to which the "eidetic poem" is but one species unto a genus. Of these common characteristics, we may say that as a general rule, the "visual poem," or "eidetics" as such, *shows* as well as or in addition to what it *tells,* and these two ends are *complementary* in their exemplification. As a general rule, the visual poem has available to its *reader* the occasion or opportunity for a double (yea, a potentially multifold) and often (but not necessarily) coinciding, *if not simultaneous,* interpretation (or, *understanding*). I would hold these decidedly abstract rules to apply to the Pompeian *Paternoster,* up to and beyond Herbert to Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, to now.

What I refer to as, "the poetic template," is <u>the outlining pattern or eidos</u> that (certainly traditionally, *but then in visual poetry as well and with a sense all its own*) coincidentally accrues to the poem upon its being quilled or scripted or inscribed or however recorded or preserved, or reproduced, whether by handwriting or typewriting or typographical (or word processor) design. The poetic template, generally speaking, consists of *the margin* and *the indentation* (*the margin and indentation pattern*).

The poetic template corresponds, is communicated to, the eye; it is seen and it is read (interpreted and understood), but it is not, strictly speaking, heard or recited.

It is the poetic template that undergoes a dislocation in "open field poetics." Predominantly, a dislocation of the margin. For while "open field" eschews the uniformity of the (nevertheless elastic) poetic template, it freely admits of anything and everything else. And yet, not unintentionally, while the open field procedure eschews the "traditional" margin and indentation poetic template pattern, it brings to the page a poetic template — *of margins and indentations and subdivisions* — all its own. The open field poetic template — while certainly in a sense *eidetic* — is in nowise *anterior* to the poem, is in a manner of speaking *interior* to the poem, and is properly given to insight and inference.

See *The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory,* ed. J. A. Cuddon (3rd ed., 1992). The entry for "concrete poetry/verse" (p. 184) reads in part, "The object is to present each poem as a different shape. It is thus a matter of pictorial typography which produces 'visual poetry.'" The entry for "pattern poetry" (p. 693) reads in part, "Probably Oriental in origin, this kind of poem has its lines arranged to represent a physical object, or to suggest action/motion, mood/feeling; but usually shape and motion."

See *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics,* ed. A. Preminger, F. J. Warnke and O. B. Hardison (enlarged ed., 1974). The entry for "pattern poetry" (p. 607) reads in part, "Verse in which the disposition of the lines is such as to represent some physical object or to suggest motion, place, or feeling in accord with the idea expressed in the words. The pattern poem, or 'shaped' poem, first appears in Western-world literature in the works of certain Gr. bucolic poets, notably in a few poems of Simias of Rhodes (ca. 300 B.C.), later much imitated."

NB Where concerns *complementarities,* the operative words here are *in accord with the idea expressed in the words*. Thus *the pattern, or shape,* and *the idea expressed in the words,* must *complement* or *complete* each other, *and must be generative the one of the other!* There is a subtle and important distinction between "a complementarity" and "an equivalence." While "an equivalence" is an equality of value (say, for instance, the illustration of a content), a "complementarity" is held to supply a complement, to complete or to make complete. The complementarity is in no wise tangential, but is of, or, toward the constitutive essence of the composition (i.e., of the object). I maintain, the complementarities of eidetic poetry (if not of all "concrete poetry") *are equally* (though not necessarily in extent or to degree) *and essentially generative the one of the other!*

In this sense, "concrete poetry" (and "pattern" and "shaped") would be synonymous with "visual poetry."

When considering the history of "concrete poetry" (which is to say, of its forerunners, all which are by degrees approximations) it is most fruitful to take into account all the various names by which it has been called. "Concrete poetry" is a development of *carmen figuratum* ("figure poem" or "shaped poem"). At this point in time, it would seem that "visual poetry" (or, "vis-po") is a recent development of "concrete poetry." Each term seems to denote both a generality (a genus) and a specificity (a species). It would seem that of all the terms in current

usage, "visual poetry" is the most general, while being also the least informed.

What is *eidos*? It is language. *Langue.* The sea of language. The sea of relationality. *The great postulated transcendent totality of system.* It is mystici corporis. It is antiquus mysticusque. It is prisca sapientia. It is logos. It is logical space. It is plastic.

Not photograph, but eidograph. Not photographic, but eidographic. Not *a showing* made with light, but *a showing* of the *. . . making conscious the unconscious.* The made-visible e-merges (from obscurity — clair-*obscur*) depicting (a "looking-through," the *trans-parens*) what takes place *below* our (superficial) verbal consciousness.

The eidograph is a picture of language-in-eidos, of language in conceptus, language in situ, in general, in ideal form. An eidograph is a telling by way of showing, it is a concrete telling, it is the special poésie of the eidetic poet. The eidograph is a picture of language-in-eidos.

Qhat does it mean to say of one thing, this is a "depiction," and of another, this is a "reality in itself"? Is this to deny of the depiction a "reality in itself"? Is this to deny of the "reality in itself" a significance that transcends that "reality"? For instance, let's speak of value (if not of ontology). There is value in the depiction, and there is value in the thing that is a "reality in itself" — there is value in its being a "reality in itself," there is value in that "reality," that "in-itself-ness." There is value in the depiction *in that* it is a depiction, and *in how* it is a depiction, and *in why* it is (said/seen to be) a depiction. When we say there is value in the "reality in itself," we are saying that "reality in itself," as such, is a value, and "as such" is given to mean that it is not about anything other than itself, it does not stand for anything other than itself, it is self-referential, it does not point away from itself but *means*

only in so far as *it is* (in so far as it is *what* it is, if not *that* it is). It has value as an independent object. The object has a certain "objectivity" about it (a certain *whereness,* though we do not wish to restrict this ubiety to the prison house of the page). (One might say it is "anti-mimetic," although to use the term "anti" would seem to attribute to the object *intention,* and it does not seem possible to me that a "reality in itself" can have *intention,* and so to say something is "anti-mimetic" is not to say something about the object but about the purpose of the object, at which point we have gone outside that "reality in itself." And yet, such an object has been, and still is, held to stand for, to speak to or to otherwise illuminate certain artistic and/or social concerns — indeed, we might say it is *programmatic,* or even *theory laden.* In which case the "reality in itself" is positioned as *an object hypothesis,* something given in advance, and accepted without judgment. *Given A, is not B analogous to C?* This does seem to give the "reality in itself" a significance that transcends that "reality." It does seem to stand for and to point to something *outside* itself, even if that something outside is *just* an object hypothesis.) And herein lies its "concreteness." But to speak of "concrete poetry" in terms of this understanding of the term "concreteness" is, or so it seems to me, to speak of only a particluar kind of concrete poetry, and a kind of concrete poetry that is possibly more a form of art than of poetry. Why, then, call it poetry? Because it employs words (language)? Why not, "concrete writing" or even "language art"? It seems to me, if a form of writing is to partake of the title, of the encomium, "poetry," we should be able to discern in it some or other poetic elements, *or even poetic forebears. . . .*

And besides, poetry doesn't have exhibitions, "visual poetry" has exhibitions.

meaning / naming

We can say *They are not against meaning, but naming, because to name would be to point away, to a reality outside, to a separate reality, to an "other." To what is not.*

But, as for the work itself, as for that "reality in itself," how, *if it is to have meaning,* can it not be in some sense mimetic?

To mean, to signify, must correspond to something other, even if that something other were a mirror image of itself.

Or is the "reality in itself" unintelligible? *Can the unintelligible be* [be rendered] *beautiful?*

We can say: *This is writing that is not writing words. This is writing that is* showing *words, but not words* qua *words, that is to say not words as signs* (parole), *but rather words as symbols.*

are these *words as symbols* "verbal"? do they "express"? or are they "visual"?

faced with a symbol, what do we see? what do we know? what comes to mind? what does it mean to be "in community" with a symbol?

      to communicate / to be *in community* / to hold in common

> *ainissesthai* — "to speak darkly," "to speak in riddles"
> *Follow the lion's gaze.*

Eidography? Symbollurgy?

Draw for me the hieroglyphic of the world. [By necessities *a griphos?*]

Eidography is the symbollurgy of the hieroglyphic of the world.

What does the hieroglyphic of the world look like? [By necessities *a griphos?*]

intellection / ideation

Let us consider, "poetry in general." I offer here a simple proposition: "The poem" exists on the page, in concrete language, in the form of *a deposition* ("a putting down"), but *the poetry* exists, or rather *comes into being,* or, *is realized,* in the mind (via the conscious intellection / the conscious ideation) of the reader [the redding]. While "the poem" exists in deposition, *the poetry* resides with the reader [the redding]. Now where concerns concrete poetry, but specifically the concrete poetry that is the "reality in itself," we can say that *the whereness* of *the poetry* of concrete poetry is at the level of that deposition. Now bear in mind, this is not to say of that "reality in itself" that it does not have *or show* an eidos (a form, an eidetic form), as in fact this eidos is this "text's" entire raison d'etre.

Bear in mind the difference between the "concrete" eidos and that eidos that accompanies the text of "poetry in general." In the case of "poetry in general," here we find an eidos that is properly understood to be a margin and indentation pattern, this pattern, or scheme, or, template (I call this "the poetic template") signals to the reader a number of things, beginning with, "I am a poem." Compare the outward eidetic form of a sonnet to, say, Solt's "Moonshot Sonnet" or to Christian Morgenstern's "Fisches Nachtgesang."

We can draw the outlines of three distinct types of concrete poetry: Let us call the first type, "concrete," and here find that text that *is identical with what it shows,* that is the "anti-mimetic" text, the "reality in itself," the text that *means* but does not *name.* Let's call the next type, "shape," and here find, in addition to the aforementioned "Easter Wings," John Hollander's "Swan and Shadow." And let us, but provisionally, call the third type "abstract," and say that here "language elements" are not employed as signals-to-meaning but as *symbols* suggestive of a system of meaning, *a thought structure.*

I think we can safely say of all three types that each is, in a sense, a "reality in itself." Moreover, to the degree that each type presents, or is, a spatial arrangement (and to the extent that such presents, or is, or is perceived to be, a shape, a figure, an outline, a pattern, or <u>to be meaningful or significant visually</u>), I think we can safely say of all three types that each is, or presents, *an eidos.* And on that basis, each type — "concrete," "shape," "abstract" — is, I maintain, a type of "eidetic poetry." But this is not to restrict "eidos" to a form that is perceived only visually, for while we may speak of *an eidetic element* that is *given to instantaneous apprehension,* as per to look upon, we can also speak of *an eidetic element* that is given <u>to conscious intellection and ideation</u>, for indeed while it is one thing to see a spatial arrangement, it is another thing to know it as meaningful (and indeed, as significant).

As for *this eidos* (as we speak of it here as the visual component or *complementarity*), I think it is this aspect of the concrete-poetry composition that Mary Ellen Solt is referring to when she says of concrete poetry (in her footnote to "Moonshot Sonnet") that it is "supranational, supralingual." And this can be so because there is no language barrier interfering with <u>the instantaneous apprehension</u> of the object (its shape or pattern, its spatial arrangement). Here we find the truly supranational nature of eidetic poetry. But this is not to reduce eidetic poetry to its eidetic (i.e., "visual") complementarity only, as then we would be acknowledging only one half of the equation. We must also acknowledge its poetic elements, its "lingual" or language

complementarity, as here we find an eidos, *a form,* of a different nature, the eidos, or form, of the noun.

We'll skip over the second type of eidetic poetry (the "shape poem") except to mention that in Herbert's "Easter-wings" and in Hollander's "Swan and Shadow" we find instances of the consummate working out (the working together) of both the eidetic and poetic elements (both serve to complete each other, *as complementarities,* and both are generative the one of the other), and we'll move on to the third type, the "abstract" eidetic poem. It may seem a contradiction in terms to speak of *an abstract concrete poem,* that is unless we bear in mind a keen distinction:

Quite simply, concrete is to the senses as abstract is to the mind.

Consider, a picture drawn in words [a narrative, say], however detailed or explicit, will always be *an abstraction* (literally *a drawing-away, a separation*) from nature, requiring conscious intellection and ideation on the part of the reader, whereas to see a picture is a matter of instantaneous apprehension — it is there (it has *whereness*), it appears to the senses, it has a material, perceptible existence, it is a "reality in itself."

NB The forms found in the first type of concrete poetry are rarely found in nature, unlike those found in the second type, which usually are. This is important if the "forms" found in the first type are to be considered "nonrepresentational," and a "reality in itself," and not a depiction (*not mimetic*) from nature! We may ask, then, just what kind of forms are to be found in the first type of concrete poetry. . . ? I don't think it will be an imposition on these works (to the contrary, it may increase them) to say of these forms that they are Platonic. (See Plato, *Philebus,* 51 c-d. "I mean not the figures of creatures in real life. I mean a straight line, a curve and the plane and solid figures. These are not realtively beautiful, but are beautiful in their very nature.") And we should not be surprised

to find in the third type, in the "abstract" type, that the same kind of forms apply.

Concrete is to the senses as abstract is to the mind can also be conceived of as *concrete is to what shows as abstract is to what tells.* In the preamble to my e-chap *Go Mirrored* I present the analogy, "We might say, then, that the 'visual' component of the concrete poem is to the analogue clock what the semantic component is to the digital clock, in that the one shows what the other tells."

We must bear in mind, that the "concrete" in "concrete poetry" has always, above all, been rooted in this distinction, in this sense of instantaneous apprehension — as distinct from the conscious intellection of words. There is no contradiction, then, to considering a concrete poetry, an "eidetic poetry," that is both at basis "concrete" and formally abstract.

Compare / contrast this idea of "instantaneous apprehension" with Pound's authoritative assertion on the Image in the "Imagist" poem ("An 'Image' is that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time. . . . It is the presentation of such a 'complex' instantaneously. . . .") and with Richard Kostelanetz's notion of the "imaged word."

Why has concrete poetry become abstract? We must consider our answer in regard to both the "shaped" and the "concrete" poem — that poets have simply given up on depicting shapes and figures from nature. I don't see this as a matter of talent or ability, but rather, and what is more crucial, as a sign of the "dissociation of sensibility" which while having its origin elsewhere (and in another time) has never ceased to hold sway. We might call this situation "a fragmentation of sensibility," in which the individual exists "in exploded view" (a consequence,

perhaps, of being analyzed to pieces, pieces which relate but find their relation to be problematical). Interest has turned inward, has become intra-subjective, in the knowledge of and in search of and in the exploration of a transcendent system of meaning. If not the collective unconscious, the occupation is with relationality as such (the very nature of interrelation, of interdependence, of mutual aver). If it is not to know, and to subdue, Langue — the current, great preoccupation — it is to know and to subdue the self, or perhaps to know and to subdue the world writ large. While willing, and able, to turn from naming, there remains an unwillingness, or an unableness, to turn from meaning. Even the signs turn inward and become symbols, unable to say with certainty but only to suggest (only to show, and to tell, indirectly).

Qhat?

Addendum 3:

On Mathematical Poetry

There has to be considerd the analogy between the grammatical sentence and the mathematical sentence. Already ("mathematical sentence") I'm thinking analogically.

There has to be considered the analogy between the grammar of the sentence and the "mathematics" of the equation (i.e., of the mathematical statement).

What is the grammar [the syntax, the semantics] of numbers and symbols? What is the grammar of magnitudes, relationships and attributes? Or is this already clear. . . ?

Write for me the mathematical sentence equivalent of the sentence, "Peter is sitting on the chair." Write for me the mathematical sentence equivalent of "sitting on" existing as an entity apart from any sitter.

Mathema = "what is learned."

a math poem grammar if not / then a math poem gramarye

Change + purse = church.
kite + propeller = wing.
to + to = too.
am = be + I
secrets = ? + whispers

for Cubby

For "Self-Portrait with Bandaged Ear," *Onedit* #7, 2007.

For the "Crash Course in Logoclastics," *Disturbed Guillotine* #3, 1997, and *Fell Swoop* #43, 1996.

For "Logoclasody," *The Argotist Online, Generator,* and *Word For/Word* #8, 2005.

For "logoclastics," *Aught* #14, 2005, *The Poet's Corner at Fieralingue, Pudding Magazine: The International Journal of Applied Poetry* #29, 1996, and *Unpleasant Event Schedule.*

For "Mathematical Poetry," see "Notes on Bob Grumman's Mathemaku and on Mathematical Poetry Generally" by Gregory Vincent St. Thomasino (with commentary by mathematician John Randall), *Meat Epoch* #20, 1997, reprinted online, *Word For/Word* #13, 2008, see "Bob Grumman Interviewed" by Gregory Vincent St. Thomasino, *eratio eidetics* issue one, 2003, and see "Kaz Maslanka Interviewed" by Gregory Vincent St. Thomasino, *Word For/Word* #13, 2008.

And for "Visual Poetry," see "Some Notes after Irving Weiss' *Visual Voices*" by Gregory Vincent St. Thomasino, *Meat Epoch* #19, 1996, reprinted online, *The Eratio Blog-Auxiliary,* September 4, 2006, and see "Afterword and Addendum to Nico Vassilakis' STAMPOLOGUE" by Gregory Vincent St. Thomasino, *eratio eidetics* issue three, 2004, reprinted, *The Argotist Online,* 2006.

taxis de pasa logos

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